Ben & Jerry's - Japan

BEN & JERRY'S - JAPAN

1. Strengths of hagan daz

Founded in 1961 in New Jersey by Reuben Mattus, Hagen Daz specialized in superpremium products with additional sales derived from sorbets, frozen youghurt and novelties. In contrast to Ben & Jerry's who became known for their funky packages and names, Hagan Daz promoted a sophisticated image. By 1994 the company had the largest market share with 44% compared to Ben & Jerry's 34% of the American superpremium market, with 230 scoop shops and 163, respectively.

Hagan Daz's main strength was that the company recognized early that future growth would have to come from new products or from foreign markets. By 1997, while Ben & Jerry's nearly had caught up with Hagan Daz in US market share, Hagan Daz already had successfully expanded to Japan, where, by the time B&J still contemplated about entering the market, H. D. had already sales of $300 million dollars; providing the highest margins of any of Hagan Daz's markets. Further, Hagan Daz managed to capture nearly half of the superpremium market in Japan. The strategy Hagan Daz used was to first export its product to Japan and then later began production in Japan at a plant owned jointly by Hagan Daz, Sentry and Takanashi Milk Products. Besides the fact that 25% of Hagan Daz's sales in Japan appeared to be from scoop shops, the company also operated fleet of ice cream parlor buses, with upper deck café tables, at exhibitions and other public gathering; marketing strategies B&J's would never be able to afford due to its size and financial resources, let alone the company's lack of expertise.

* By the time bj considered to enter the Japanese market, hd had already sales of $300 million, with japan providing the highest margins of any of its markets.

* Managed to capture nearly half the superpremium market in japan

- Entered the market as an imported product and later began production in japan at a plant owned jointly by hd, sentry and takanashi milk products.

- 25 per cent of hd 'sales there appeared to be from scoop shops

- Also operated fleet of ice

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* Bj only main competitor

* Promoted a sophisticated image

* 1994: largest market share 44 per cent compared to bj 34 per cent of the American superpremium market

* 97: hd 4.6 per cent ; bj at 3.4 per cent of the market

* Market leader

* Specialized in superpremium products with additional sales derived from sorbets, frozen yoghurt and novelties

- Pioneered the category back in 1961 when reuben mattus founded the company in new jersey

* 230 shops / bj 163

* Prices often twice as expensive as conventional ice cream and premium brands

* Recognized early that future growth would have to come from new products or from new = foreign markets

- > while by 97 bj had nearly caught up with hd in us market share, hd was light years ahead in the non-us markets.

2. Entering japan consistent w/ firms mission?

Since the establishment of the company Ben & Jerry's, its Ben Cohen and Jerry Greenfield were proud to be known as a socially responsible company known for its caring capitalism; expanding for pure growth reasons was not acceptable. Ben Cohen in particular was engaged in efforts to further social justice by such activities as attending meetings of similarly-minded CEOs from around the world.

When the question whether to enter the Japanese market arose, Cohen and others on the board of directors shared the concern that these move would neither be the result of any social mission, nor would the companies mission match the Japanese culture; "the concepts of social mission and corporate charity being foreign in Japan". Further, since the 90s, the company moved beyond using its profit to fund philanthropy. The new imperative was to "make the workplace, community and world a better place through regular day-to-day operations". Therefore, when evaluating whether entering Japan was consistent with the company's mission, the answer is: no. However, "Greenfield was interested enough to visit Japan on a market research tour in early 1996" and also the board realized that in order to finance their social projects, or even their day-to-day operations, profit was needed and that entering the Japanese market could generate the needed capital.

* 711 deal could represent a sudden boost in the company's flagging sales of the past several years (perry oak)

* Strategic and not opportunistic perspective

* Socially responsible company - known for its caring capitalism

* Ben was particularly enganged in efforts to further of social justice by such activities as attending meetings of similarly-minded CEOs from around the world

* Cohen and others on the board shared concern that entering japan would not be the result of any social mission

* Since the 90s, the company had moved beyond using its profit to fund philanthropu. The new imerative was to make the workplace, community and world a better place - a philosophy - according to the text - unfollowed in japan - through regular day-to-day operations

* However, in order to finance these projects, profits were needed. And entering japan could be the ticket to those profits

3. Why enter japan when previous intern. Efforts had low success?

By 1997, B&J's international sales totaled merely 3% of total sales, which were the result of various opportunistically rather than a strategically move. The company's "efforts" to enter foreign markets were neither supported by a sound business plan, a strategy, a marketing campaign for entering the foreign markets, promotion support, any knowledge about the foreign laws and standards, nor the managerial skills needed. However, with declining profits and markets share, B&J's had to give entering foreign markets a serious thought; despite of the concern whether this new attempt would be successful.

The Japanese