Metaphysics of the Wil - Schopenhauer's Singular Thought

Schopenhauer's Singular Thought

In the introduction of The World as Will and Representation, Schopenhauer asserts what he claims as the "organic unity" of his philosophy (Schopenhauer 30). Schopenhauer is very decided in his intention. His ideas, becoming observations of the nature of the world and as such lacking a chronology of presentation, become organic parts to the entirety of his philosophy, the singular truth, that Schopenhauer intends to unveil. Fascinatingly (perhaps frustratingly) enough, and to the bafflement of his audience, Schopenhauer never precisely states, throughout the entirety of his text, what this singular thought, this truth finally is, and his single thought, his final organism, remains ambiguous. Instead he leaves it to his audience to grapple with the influx of observations- brilliant nonetheless- in an effort to express his ideology in a singular form. And so we do just this. We set out to test Schopenhauer's validity, to sum up Schopenhauer's truth as one thought, to literally and not just metaphorically express it as a singular idea, in an attempt to find the unity that Schopenhauer so passionately asserts- really is there.

Often times Schopenhauer's singular thought is defined by the title of his book- The World as Will and Representation. This singular thought is taken to be the dual character of the world, the material world and its phenomenon, and its inner nature, what Schopenhauer has called throughout his text as- "the thing in itself." Yes it is conspicuous that Schopenhauer's ideology rests on this claim and it is perhaps his most ardent assertion. Yet to define Schopenhauer's philosophy simply by the title of his work is not to do it justice. In defining this philosophy in this manner one makes a very grave error- one stops too short- for one of the most intriguing aspects of Schopenhauer's philosophy is the concept of the strife of the will to know itself. Taking all of Schopenhauer's ideas into context, as he intended by his preceding lecture on the organic nature of his philosophy, one finds his singular thought to exceed simply the concept of the dual nature of the world. In this respect, one of the most appealing singular definitions to Schopenhauer's philosophy is that devised by John Atwell- "The double sided world is the striving of the will to become conscious of itself so that, recoiling in horror at its inner, self divisive nature, it may annul itself and thereby its self affirmation and then reach salvation" (Atwell). It is this claim that, when supported by Schopenhauer's ideas withstands the analysis.

Throughout his philosophy, Schopenhauer likens the material world of phenomenon to Plato's myth of the cave. The visible world becomes a mere a representation of the will- the inner nature of this world. Whilst this world of representation is exposed to the principle of sufficient reason in all its forms, the will is free from its influence. This will, in Schopenhauer's philosophy, becomes a blind purposeless striving force unhindered by any forms of the principle of sufficient reason. Schopenhauer's main argument, then, is that human rationalism, what he calls a consciousness, is the product of the mechanism of the will and allows for an understanding of this inner nature of the world. He denounces the ideas of theoretical egoism in interpreting the expansive nature of the will as ideas belonging in "mad houses" and explains that once this theoretical egoism is abandoned, and this human strife extrapolated to the phenomenon of the entire universe, then humans can have a sense of the inner nature of the entire world- the will. Following this understanding, all explanations of reason and of logic and those based solely on the phenomenon of the real world remain secondary to the ultimate truth- the striving, purposeless, inner nature of the world of representation.

This secondary explanation of the world, this explanation based on logic and on reason is, according to Schopenhauer, the scientific endeavor. This is not to say that Schopenhauer discredits science in any form, in fact he uses the existence of the endeavor itself to explain the accuracy of his concepts of the principle of sufficient reason. By presenting the applicability- the necessity in fact- of the four forms of the principle of sufficient reason in the connections of the phenomenon of the material world he is able to give credence to the scientific endeavor.

However, according to Schopenhauer, the limitations of science in understanding the true inner nature of the world are necessary to recognize. The principle of sufficient reason simply explains the connections and the combinations of the phenomena of the world and not the phenomena themselves. The limitation of science, according to Schopenhauer, is dependent on the limitation of explanation, and explanation by causation can only go so far. As Awet Moges summarizes Schopenhauer's ideas, "each phenomenon obeys the laws that constitutes its form, and has a cause that is explained only within a definite time and space, always as a particular phenomenon, and never according to its inner nature" (Moges).

As long as science remains within the realm of the material world, observing the causal connections between phenomenon, Schopenhauer has no objections. As long as science aims to answer the more immediate "why" questions, Schopenhauer asserts its legitimacy. It is when science exceeds these realms and infringes on the realms of philosophy, when science aims to answer the "what" questions, that Schopenhauer is forced to remind scientists of their limitations.

Schopenhauer's main complaints against science are a response to what he believes is an arrogant scientific assertion of the validity of the concept of reductionism, a concept which attributes the random interactions of chemical entities by mechanical forces as explanation of the world, the inner character of which science cannot possibly know (Schopenhauer 142). Schopenhauer denies the supposition that science has some form of authority, in his own words, " to refer the higher grades of the will's objectivity to the lower ones" an idea he ardently revokes, and places within the realm of philosophy (Schopenhauer 143).

Schopenhauer had defined knowledge as only a component of "the objectification of the will at its higher grades," mankind being the epitome of the grades of this objectification (Schopenhauer 33). In this sense, then, human knowledge of the world is entirely subservient to the will, simply a means for this will to achieve its ends- or in this particularly fascinating case, the lack of an end. "Therefore, destined originally to serve the will for the achievement of its aims,