Determinism Case

The following essay will examine three different propositions regarding the topic of determinism and free will. The intent is to make clear which proposition is most valid and which the most practical.

Determinism, as described by Peter van Inwagen, is the conjunction of the following two theses; that for any instant in time, there must be a proposition which expresses the state of the world at said instant, and that if A and B are propositions which express the state of the world at some instants, then the conjunction of A with the laws of physics entail B (Courseware, 187). Also, van Inwagen defines free will in terms of the ability of an agent to act otherwise than they actually do (Courseware, 188). Determinism and free will are incompatible in van Inwagen's view, however it is important to discern that he does not attribute the incompatibility of free will and determinism according to the thesis that every event has a cause, but that free will is incompatible with determinism in regards to its conjunctive definition as previously mentioned (Courseware, 192).

Moreover, Frankfurt discusses the concept of a person and the essential attributes which comprise the subject of our most humane concerns (Courseware, 175). An essential attribute put forth as uniquely human is our structure of will (Courseware, 176). The essential difference between humans and other animals is the ability to conceive second-order desires, where one may wish to have preferences that are different than those currently enlisted as first-order desires (Courseware, 176). More specifically, a first-order desire involves wanting or not wanting a particular desire, whereas second-order desires either want or do not want to have certain first-order desires (Courseware, 176). Consequently, second-order volitions ensue as the result of conflict between first-order and second-order desires (Courseware, 178).

Furthermore, Aristotle asserts that contingent propositions deny the validity of determinism, rejecting that all occurrences are a product of necessity where the affirmation or negation must be either true or false (Courseware, 172). However, under the consideration of events that are "not always actual" (in the case where things are not always so or not always not so), he concludes that the possibility of these events either coming to be or not coming to be is equal, thus permitting incidences to occur by chance and not necessity (Courseware, 173).

The most plausible proposition appears to be van Inwagen's analysis on the incompatibility of determinism and free will. Determinism in this view encompasses the state of the entire physical world at any instant; it should follow that any observable change in the physical world be accompanied by some change in the state of the entire world (Courseware, 187). For at any instant that change occurs, the state of the entire physical world is altered and therefore becomes different from the world it was. Also, the notion of free will accepts that an agent could act differently than he does (Courseware, 188). It is rooted in determinism that the conjunction of A with the laws of physics entails B (Courseware, 187), and this restriction on "state" dictates that truth in determinism depends upon the character of the laws of physics (Courseware, 187). By this restriction, determinism could only hold true if its integral properties were akin to those of the laws of physics. If determinism is true, the notion of free will must be false since an agent could not render any law of physics false. In support of this, van Inwagen addresses the possibility of rendering some proposition false, he concludes that if some proposition could be rendered false by performing an act which an agent does not in actuality perform, it would suffice that the proposition is not a law of physics (Courseware, 191). Given this account, the agent still cannot change the state of the world and free will remains incompatible with determinism.

Aristotle contemplates whether all things which come to be are of necessity rather than chance (Courseware, 172). He elaborates that if something cannot not-happen, then it is impossible for it to not happen, and so it is necessary that it happens (Courseware, 172). If it were impossible that something did not happen, what is the feature of this impossibility which makes it necessary that something happen? Imagine that some event must either occur or not occur and represents two possible outcomes. Now if another possibility were introduced which could be true or false at the same time that the prior mentioned possibilities be true or false, it would still follow that one or the other afore mentioned possibilities occurs out of necessity. Consider for instance Aristotle's sea-battle, the sea-battle must either occur or not occur (Courseware, 172). If the battle does not not-occur, then it follows that the battle occurs by necessity, now if we introduce the possibility that the sea may dry up and for argument's sake say that it does, then the sea-battle can only not occur and there is only one possible outcome that can be true, rendering the negation false. On the other hand, if the sea does not dry up it would still hold true that a sea-battle must either occur, or not occur. In either case, only the affirmation or negation can be true and renders the other false thus taking form through necessity. Contrary to this, Aristotle believes that only things which are not always "actual" may be equal in possibility of either occurring or not occurring, thus manifesting by chance (Courseware, 173). However