How Persuasive Philosophically Is the Doctrine That Learning Is Recollection?

How Persuasive Philosophically is the Doctrine that Learning is Recollection?

In the Meno, Meno presents Socrates with a paradox about inquiry. He argues that there is no way to inquire into something that you don't know, since you don't know how to begin and you do not know that you don't know something, but there is also no way to inquire into something that you already know, since you already have the knowledge in question. Thus, we reach the paradoxical conclusion that inquiry is impossible. Thus, Socrates attempts to unravel Meno's paradox by presenting his theory of recollection; that due to the immortality of the soul man never learns anthing but only recalls previous knowledge. It can be clearly argued however, that Socrates does not adequately defend his theory of recollection by questioning even if it cannot completely be said that it is useless and entirely unbelievable.

The first argument with proposition one is that it builds upon the idea within the theory that knowledge is what we know in the very present moment. However, it is perfectly possible to remember something which at a time in question we may not have been able to recall, especially having been asked such leading questions as Socrates asks the slave-boy. It is fair to say therefore, that knowledge is not black and white as we may have in our subconscious which is not at certain times in our conscious mind; thus it does not appear true to say that we either know or do not know something. Proposition two is correct as even though someone is able to make an inquiry to find out what they already know it is indeed a pointless exercise; proposition two therefore can be regarded as true. Proposition three is the most problematic part of Meno's paradox as it implausible for many forms of inquiry. An empirical inquiry for instance, one which is based upon observation, allows the person who is ignorant to have enough knowledge about what they do not know to ask a question and thus relieve their ignorance, for instance if we ask directions to a place. It is therefore clear that Meno's paradox only applies in the case of non-empirical questions and that Socrates' theory already appears weaker because it is not needed to explain a certain kind of inquiry.

The way in which Socrates' theory disregards empirical knowledge is crucial in how persuasive it ultimately is because the empirical evidence gathered through our senses is the perhaps the most important way in which we learn and gather new information as can most readily be seen in the way scientific progress is made. Therefore, because new information and knowledge gained in this way is in no way challenged or included with Socrates' theory, his theory does not account for how we acquire a very substantial portion of our knowledge. Furthermore, as it is easily proven that there is another way of gaining what can be considered knowledge it casts great doubt upon Socrates' theory that non-empirical knowledge is only ever recollected and not learned.

With regards to empirical questions and the theory not including them it has been argued that because Socrates uses a diagram in explaining the mathematics question to the slave boy then this piece of knowledge must be of an empirical nature and that it therefore does not demonstrate the theory in any way. In reality however, in defence of the demonstration the diagram is unimportant and the concept can be understood without it. Indeed it can be seen that it offers no help to the boy when it comes to the vital question of what effect doubling the sides will have on the area. This is conveyed through the fact that in order for the boy to realise that to halve the square he can diagonally cut it in two which will produce two identical triangles it is not an inspection of the diagram which is crucial but an already present understanding that because a square has four sides which are equal all of its angles are also equal. Despite the justified argument therefore, that Socrates is not attempting to demonstrate his theory using a piece of knowledge to which it does not apply it actually only makes the theory further questionable. This is because although it may well be that the slave-boy knows that the shape is made up of exactly congruent triangles from his knowledge about squares which merely serves to draw into question where he came to know what he does about squares, and how apparently subconsciously understands the axioms, a universally excepted principle or rule, that allow him to see the congruency of the triangles. It is clear that this in no way proves that the supposed recollection process which Socrates believes in is what tells him that the triangles are the same any more than he is recollecting the important features of a square. Thus, the origin of his understanding of the two crucial parts of the question he is being asked, the triangle and the square, are still no clearer and the theory still not persuasive.

Further from the idea that there is a problem with the type of question which Socrates asks the slave boy, it can actually be argued that it is in fact the most persuasive part of the demonstration in attempting to prove the theory. It appears clear that Socrates is suggesting through his enquiry into mathematical truths that they have a special importance. This is because it can be justifiably argued that knowledge of mathematics is something which transcends our upbringing or our education as concepts of which are something which everyone can grasp simply with a little leading, just as the slave boy does. This is because, crucially, mathematics is not culturally determined. It therefore goes beyond majority opinions, which are dictated by culture and experience, and is true whoever someone is or wherever they live. Although the nature of mathematics is not real proof of the immortality of the soul and therefore of the theory of recollection it is perhaps suggestive that man may well bring into life the capability to think a way through to a universally acknowledged truth. The way in which Socrates insists that man would never be persuaded by mathematical