Reassessing U.S. Strategy in the Aftermath of the Korean War

HIS 114-- 06

Assignment 4

(1.) William Stueck, “Reassessing U.S. Strategy in the Aftermath of the Korean War” Orbis 53, no.4 (2009): 571–590. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.orbis.2009.07.007 (accessed Nov. 17, 2013).

(2.) In the “Reassessing U.S. Strategy in the Aftermath of the Korean War” William Stueck argued that the strategies on armistice and arrange the affairs of postwar Korea mostly brought by Dwight D. Eisenhower’s admissions should be affirmed.

For replacing Democrat and win the campaign for the residency, on the one hand Eisenhower showed the public that he used to do remarkable efforts as army chief of staff and served extensively under Truman, on the other hand, he sharply criticized existing government – Truman’s policy. In the campaign, he promised more than what he seems to dedicate and didn’t provided people with detailed plans for solving existing problems. However on the affairs of ending the war of Korea, he clearly knew that reducing American army defense spending was really a matter of civil economy development. When he was facing the growing power of Soviet- Union, his challenges were to pressure the Communists to send back POWs without additional requirement and then to achieve his Republic party at home and he also tried to prevent President Rhee’s ambition growing more.

In 1953, he achieved armistice. There are aspects that allowed it to happen: Stalin died and the US national government’s attitude to Taiwan that would be no prevented from attacking the mainland and possible threatened the use of nuclear weapons. These two aspects might made the Communists willing to settle the POW issue. Furthermore, for the decisions that withdraw the U.S. military from Korea completely, Korea’s unstable economy and politics in long-term under Rhee’s rule made it hard for the U.S. to decided it, even reducing the defense expenses are difficulties for America because America usually pay a lot attention on things effects related to their economy and well-beings in the future.

Before the war ended, under Truman’s policy, American tried to made cut that impacted the defense budget, but the Soviet would rise up a more united power for expansion and retaliate towards the U.S. Since Eisenhower appeared on the political stage, what he did was reformed the NSC into the most significant decision making committee on the national security issues, set up a new advising board-- President’s Advisory Commission, and found a suitable persons to these administrations and knowledgeable on such issues.

After the discussion on the military spending, NSC 68 suggested that defense budget should increase. It was thought that this change would cause a serious effect on economy like bankrupting. Humphrey and Dodge showed their support by developing a plan to balance the FY1954 budget through cuts in national security and other government section’s spending separately. On the contrary, secretary of State Dulles disagreed, arguing that the adoption of setting a ceiling on defense spending before development of a general strategic concept made no sense. They emphasis how atomic weapons over conventional force would produce impactful savings. In addition, Eisenhower and Bradlley emphasize both use of atomic weapons and conventional capabilities. In April the organization quickly accepted a budget proposal for FY 1954. First the Planning Board drafted the NSC 149, which realized that maintaining the decision on spending for the long-term required the budget to be balanced. Rather than simply decreasing or set a ceiling for the budget on defense, reducing overhead, and eliminating “waste and duplication” will gradually make it possible to achieve saving.

By the time Eisenhower temporarily resolved the budget issue, he had delivered a major foreign policy speech including the psychological warfare offensive (the method adopted since Truman’s policy) and an appeal to all people in an effort on improving standards of living instead of focusing on prevailing competition. Eisenhower also recited the key issue in both Asia and Europe. He excluded the extreme of preventive war and unilateral disarmament. The contest was between three tasks. In Task Force A’s Approach the U.S. would keep armed force able enough to keep the U.S secure and take advantage of the Soviet weakness. Time is used as advantage in this strategy. They believed that Soviet power will decline to a point that they won’t be a threat to the world. Task B had a narrower mission that defines a policy between Soviet and the U.S, prohibits any invasion around the boarder. Task