Scmt 373 - Evaluations of Security Programs - Building Security Design

Building Security Design

Russell L. Becker

American Military University

SCMT 373 Evaluations of Security Programs

Prof. Robert Baker

April 22, 2011

BASIS OF DESIGN

The existing facility used for this research is the headquarters building is located in Camp Lejeune, North Carolina. The headquarters building is a two-story building that sits aside the North Carolina inlets of the Atlantic Ocean. The first floor is the headquarters element of 2nd Marine Division and the 2nd floor is the headquarters element of II Marine Expeditionary Force. Natural Surveillance requires human presence and there is always someone out and about around our building so, in a sense, we have a community watch program, just not an official one. Of course the vital part of natural surveillance is the willingness of those observers to take action. Let's be honest, I work on a base with 50,000 Marines all looking for a fight. I think any observed misconduct would get its due attention.

Design Guidelines in relation to security in this building were probably not even considered as this was originally a supply building for a hospital; however, the facility now encompasses the Commanding General and all his staff sections. From my perspective in regards to the current use of this building as a classified storage area I think the site design is perfect. We do not want anyone just hanging around our area because of the nature of security. Having a mostly open area around the building gives a sense of separation from everyone and we enjoy the benefit that we can see you coming. Our site does not enable us to improve interrelationship design since this was a pre-constructed site. We have a parking area in front of our building with designated parking but that is limited due to space. The common area for congregating is the loading ramp at the front side of the building. This is our smokers' hangout and social plank. There is no helping the current street design as we only have one street with very minimal traffic that encompasses our building.

There are ten Common Access Card (CAC) entry points to the building; however, the main entrance can be accessed freely after showing proper identification to the security guard on duty. All visitors are required to enter through the main entrance and get a visitors badge once their security clearance has been verified. Visitor badges will not allow access through any other doors, unlike those who work in the building which can access any of the other entrances as long as they have their CAC.

One of the major problems within this building is tailgating. Too many times doors are held open for others and quite frequently, maintenance workers in the area prop doors open, which allows anyone to access the building. Unfortunately, this is security violation in some cases because not all workers are permitted unescorted access. This is a huge issue since many of the office spaces in the headquarters building are secure spaces and/or restricted areas. Given the known facts here we really need to take a closer look at securing this building in a better fashion. Bertolotti (2008), explains "we don't take word of mouth", if someone does not rate an access card then they just have to knock and request permission every time they wish to enter. In our ever changing, chaotic world, we have to take security seriously at every level to protect our national interests. With the national threat level elevated and our current fight against terrorism, it is important that we never let our guard down and protect our secrets properly. We need to protect everything in our building; our people, documents, and security information networks. Special consideration needs to be given to restricted and hypothetically "secure" areas. Compromise to these areas could cause grave danger to national security.

The first thing that needs to happen is that all Security Badges need to be color coded; so when someone enters a particular workspace it will be known right away what level security clearance that person has. Badges with printed security clearances are hard to read and always flip around to the level is not visible in passing. When I was in Stuttgart, Germany we had color coded badges and the ease of access was not blind. Another point is all entrances, minus the main entrance, need to be sealed off and used only as emergency exits. This would limit access and prohibit accessing entrances not manned by guards. This would further eliminate non-authorized people getting in and allow for monitoring those leaving the building. The single point entry will force everyone to enter through one entrance, be logged in, and would hopefully limit or negate tailgating. This will ensure everyone passes through security to ensure nothing is being brought in the building which should not be there. I also believe state of the art closed circuit television (CCTV) should be installed at all emergency exits so that security can watch for unauthorized persons attempting to access the building. CCTV is very effective and is a great tool for management and definitely increases productivity (Fay, J. J., 2007). CCTV can also make sure that employees and visitors are using only the main entrance to gain entry to the building. Also, there needs to be a permanent guard posted at the entrance to provide inner defenses and intrusion and access control. Outside each office space, there needs to be a card reader and keypad to limit personnel access. Access to specific areas should be limited to those who conduct daily business within the subject area, and would require an escort for those without daily business to enter.

Outside perimeter controls are currently satisfactory as we have multiple street lights, augmented by halogen lights over every entry point to illuminate any potential intruder. Our location on the base is conveniently close to the military police station which makes for quick response times if there were an unauthorized entry. Notification of authorities is ideal as our building is completely cover by an Intrusion Detection System with magnetic surface mounted door alarms and motion detection sensors throughout all hallways.

PRELIMINARY DESIGN

In the preliminary design phase, one must first take a look at what is already in place within the existing building or risk and need basis for a new building. Territorial Defense Strategies as defined by Fennelly (2004) emphasizes prevention of property-related crimes such