Vladimir Putin as a Political Leader

Vladimir Putin as a political leader

Vladimir Putin was born Oct. 7, 1952 in Leningrad. In 1975 he graduated from Leningrad State University and was assigned to work in the Soviet KGB. Served in the First Chief Directorate (foreign intelligence) of the KGB, has long worked in Germany. He is fluent in German. Worked as an assistant vice-rector of Leningrad State University for International Affairs. In 1990 he became an adviser to the chairman of Leningrad Soviet, Anatoly Sobchak. In the middle of 1990 a group of deputies of Leningrad Soviet, headed by Marina Salier and Yury Gladkov conducted a special investigation relating to the activities of Putin's licenses for export abroad of raw materials and nonferrous metals. Putin has been accused of inefficient use of power entrusted to him (in particular, in the opinion of the committee mentioned the story of the issuance of licenses for the export of raw materials abroad for the supply of food that the city, however, has not arrived), and Sobchak recommended to remove him from his positions. From 1991 to June 1996, Putin headed to St. Petersburg Mayor's Committee for External Affairs, at the same time from March 1994 to June 1996 worked as first deputy mayor of St. Petersburg. In summer 1996, Putin moved to the Kremlin, where he was appointed deputy chief of presidential administration. In March of 1997 from the Minister Pavel Borodin moved actually in the presidential administration - became deputy chief of staff (if this position was occupied by Anatoly Chubais), Chief Control Department of Administration. In November 1996, Vladimir Putin was elected leader of the St. Petersburg branch of the movement, "Our Home - Russia". From May to July 1998, Putin worked as first deputy head of presidential administration. In July of 1998, appointed Director of the Federal Security Service. In March 1999 he was appointed secretary of Russian Security Council without the liberation of his duties as director of the FSB.

Ninth in August 1999 President Boris N. Yeltsin took the next, as always, unexpected personnel decision. He signed a decree on appointment of Vladimir Putin. Instead of a soft, intelligent, Sergei Stepashin, on screens, a new face. Person, quite frankly, does not inspire either love or trust. Cold colorless eyes, compressed lips. These concise, with no arguments and flirtations. I remember the only one, however, quite elegant, pun Putin, then still chairman of the FSB, about Boris Berezovsky: "Boris Abramovich, after all, it seems, the executive secretary of the CIS?" So let him something to sing. "

Putin as prime minister predicted a brief and colorless life. "Any government will now be temporary and technical - commented that the appointment of Vladimir Ryzhkov. - At a time when Yeltsin a year away and its prestige has fallen below the sewer, any government be so." One of the leaders of the Yabloko faction Vladimir Lukin said that the new prime minister will stay in office "for three months, that is, during the election campaign."

Duma so easily accepted Putin's candidacy precisely because they viewed it as a technical prime minister. None of the parties, Putin did not pose any threat, and none of the parties did not need his support.

Announcement Putin succeeded Boris Yeltsin, seemed only worsened the situation. Politics should be the heir to the rating of three percent - that it could be worse for someone who just climbed on top of power?

Three months later, the picture changed radically. The new prime is the clear leader among the presidential candidates. Some believe that his rating is forged, but enough to hold their own public opinion poll to see: people who are ready today to vote for Vladimir Putin, has actually become substantially larger. Not only this, almost all parties and movements, one way or another, were in favor of Putin.

How Putin managed to achieve such a rating? The answer to this question will help solve the current courses of study. Our goal is to understand what Vladimir Putin as its strategy as a policy, as the most likely future president today. It is time, finally, to "vote my heart" jump to "vote wisely". The task is so urgent, and the answers yet so vague that today PR-campaign against Putin has built on the premise "we do not know who he is."

Putin today solves one critical problem for him - he creates a real mechanism of power that can adequately respond to the operational challenges and, furthermore, to develop and implement a strategy. And as long as this mechanism would not be built, Putin is likely to remain neharizmaticheskim and non-ideological leader (perhaps that charisma and ideology will in the near future the necessary resources to strengthen the government). If Putin before the presidential election will not solve the task and then either he is bad president or the next president will generally be different.

Yeltsin, when he came into power, was the most powerful resource - an ideology. Society was divided into two parts - the communists and democrats. The latter were active and assertive. Yeltsin was their unquestioned leader. He could easily pick a team unspent administrative and promotional talent. Plus its hardware experience. Plus, until the time of the country's integrity, not yet fully experienced the bitterness of defeat. Yeltsin was something to steer and how to donate.

Situation is quite different from Putin. No ideology. Nobody knows the expectations of the people, the risk of a huge mistake. Motley political structure - all the parties and flawed in its powerful capabilities, and its software saturation. In this case, they are ambitious and most powerful - OVR - explicitly claim to the usurpation of the Yeltsin legacy. Not rely on anyone. Country exhausted reforms. The people are poor. Threat of disintegration of the federation is quite palpable. West changed his tone for reforms to the condemnation of Russia. Putin's nothing else to sacrifice, and literally have nowhere to retreat.

The task before Putin was one - rebuild institutions of government. And on a completely different, compared with the power of Yeltsin's grounds. This power was to be primarily a technocratic rather than ideological. The minimum program (perhaps it was written down on paper), apparently was the following:

* address operational issues and not go away;

* find political supporters and "deal with opponents;