Cold War Case

The need to strike such a balance has been with us at least since the end-

ing of the Cold War. President Clinton's nuclear posture spoke of the need to

"lead but hedge." That policy called for the United States to lead the world

in nuclear arms reductions and in programs to prevent the proliferation of

nuclear weapons, while at the same time maintaining a nuclear deterrent

force that hedged against adverse geopolitical developments. The leadership

aspect of this policy was demonstrated most vividly by a cooperative pro-

gram with Russia, established under the bipartisan Nunn-Lugar Program,

which was responsible for the dismantlement of more than 4,000 nuclear

weapons and assisted Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan in removing all of

their nuclear weapons. U.S. leadership was also demonstrated by signing the

Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and negotiating with Russia a new

arms control treaty, neither of which, however, was ratified by the Senate.

The Bush administration initially took a different view of overall strategic

priorities, but last year Secretary Gates explicitly reaffirmed that the Ameri-

can nuclear posture would be based on "lead but hedge."

President Obama has stated that the United States should work towards

the goal of the global elimination of nuclear weapons. But he has also said

that until that goal is reached, he is committed to maintain a nuclear de-

terrent that is safe, secure, and reliable. This is, in a sense, the most recent

formulation of the "lead but hedge" policy. All of the commission members

believe that reaching the ultimate goal of global nuclear elimination would

require a fundamental change in geopolitics. Indeed, if the vision of nuclear

elimination is thought of as the "top of the mountain," it is clear that it cannot

be seen at this time. But I believe that we should be heading up the mountain

to a "base camp" that would be safer than where we are today. And I also be-

lieve that getting the international political support necessary to move to this

base camp will be greatly facilitated if the United States is seen as working

for the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons. At the base camp, we would

have nuclear forces that are safe, secure and can reliably serve the perceived

need for deterrence and extended deterrence; we would be headed in the di-

rection