Iran and the Non-Proliferation Regime

Iranian leadership traditional position has been to maintain that it complies with the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and that its nuclear program is designed for entirely peaceful purposes (NYT 2011). Nevertheless. western unease from Iran's continuos failure to ensure its nuclear program is not geared towards developing nuclear weapons has prompted a series of multilateral and unilateral sanctions. The purpose of this paper is to analyze the limitations and possibilities of the strategies used so far to obtain satisfactory cooperation from Iran as part of the Non-Proliferation Regime. I will outline and compare insights from constructivists and rationalists schools of thought in an attempt to synthesize both into an understanding of ways and conditions in which the Non-Proliferation Regime works and the possible strategies to overcome the challenge represented by Iran.

In June 2010 the UN Security Council targeted Iran with its fourth round of sanctions in order to halt its uranium enrichment activities (Bruno 2011). As well, Europe, following the additional sanctions imposed by the Obama administration, imposed a series of unilateral "unprecedentedly tough" sanctions far beyond those of the UNThe US reaffirmed the ban on investment and trade with Iran (Bajoria 2011). The substance of these sanctions targeted Iran's crucial energy sector and key financial and commercial activities associated to fueling missile programs, Iranian enterprises linked or owned by Revolutionary Guards, as well as blocking Iranian aircrafts's repairs, (Security Council 2010; NYT 2011). The heat has been increasing once more in these past weeks, sparked by the US government accusations that Iran plotted the assassination of the Saudi Arabia's ambassador to the US. Obama is pushing to "apply the toughest sanctions and continue to mobilize the international community" in efforts to isolate Iran and persuade it from continuing its nuclear programs (Bajoria 2011). The current sanctions would hit hardest at Iran's financial core by denying access to the US financial system to any country that maintains transactions with Iran's central bank (Sanger and Landler, 2011)

Borrowing Krasner's (1982, p.186) definition of regimes, the Non-Proliferation Regime can be understood as the system of norms, principles, rules and decision-making procedures that aim at preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Iran is a signatory of the NPT and has hosted global initiatives such as the second International Conference on Disarmament and Non-proliferation, held in Tehran in June 2011(Tehran Times 2011). Furthermore, Iranian leaders often boast about their own "efforts to help create a world free of nuclear weapons" (ibid). However, the other members of the Non-Proliferation Regime do not trust Iran's words and intensions. And after either coercive tactics or diplomatic efforts, the position of Iran remains at odds in a regime that aspires to put an end to the nuclear threat. If we observe the patterns of behavior of participants, on the one hand of western actors leaded by the US and Europe, and on the other Iran in the context of previous and possibly future sanctions, we find that rationalist and constructivist frameworks offer different yet complementary understandings of the dynamics at play within the Non-Proliferation Regime.

Krasner's four elements of a regime can be analytically divided in two categories. On one side, the sets of norms and principles that underpinning the webs of rules and decision making procedures on the other side. The NPT is the most salient and representative body of rules and procedures of the Non-Proliferation Regime. It is a legal document that delineates the system of safeguards and institutionalizes the core principles of the regime, namely: non-proliferation, right of peaceful nuclear activities and eventual total disarmament (Smith 1987). In his discussion of what constitutes the Non-Proliferation Regime, Smith (1987, pp.257-8) identifies that the basic norm of the Non-Proliferation Regime is posited in the "nuclear bargain". He explains that this bargain lays out the shared expectation that non-nuclear states will restrain from pursuing nuclear weapons and in return nuclear states will provide the non-nuclear states with the fullest nuclear technology for peaceful uses, also they would halt the growth--and eventually eliminate--their own nuclear arsenal. Smith (1987, p.256) argues that norms and principles constitute the essence of a regime because they "inculcate an anticipation of reciprocity". Axelrod and Keohane's (1985) arguments would explain that reciprocity in this sense, plays on the instrumental role of norms. Instrumentally norm have the effect to garner states acceptance to not proliferate. And they agree to comply with the rules and decision making procedures of the regime because states compare the cost of mutual defection--that is all states proliferating--with the benefits of mutual cooperation that is nuclear stability.

However, anticipation of reciprocity is not evident in the behavior of the states and agents that form the Non-Proliferation Regime. In spite of sanctions, Iran has continued the concealment of its nuclear activities and it has boasted that it "will continue its 20 percent enrichment, which is in a direct violation of the United Nations Security Council resolution" (Sanger and Slackman 2010). On the other hand, Iran has argued that the missile defense shield developed by the US violates the terms of the NPT (Tehran Times 2011). Iran has also pointed out the unwillingness of nuclear states to move forward their commitments to disarm, and despite international pressure there has not been much progress (BBC 2000; Katz 2011). It is clear that in face of little expectation of reciprocity, Iran and the US and its allies see each other as adversaries within the same regime. It is also evident that collective power, military and otherwise, of the US and its allies, is far superior than Iran's, even if it achieved a nuclear weapon to be able to retaliate in case of a nuclear attack. Thus, neither a balance of power is enough to reach nuclear stability, nor interest evaluation or reciprocity expectations can achieve cooperation. 888888888888888

A rationalist approach is useful in identifying the conditions under which a regime can be the most efficient in achieving cooperation. Jervis (1982) argues that for a security regime is specially difficult to achieve because of the unforgiving and highly sensitive nature of security issues. The basic regulative effects of the Non-Proliferation regime, by which actors accept what is permissible to do according to Barkin (2006, p.74), is deterring non-nuclear states from developing nuclear weapons. A perhaps unintended regulative effect is that it