Iraq War

The Iraq War is a decent overview of the recent war in Iraq. It's strongest points are made in the early chapters where the authors attempt to put the war in context. "Origins of War" and "The Opposing Sides" are the best summaries I've seen on the build up and causes of the war -- from Saddam's duplicity to the UNs fecklessness, Murray and Scales provide an outstanding background as to why war occurred. The summary on the ground war was adequate, while the chapter on the air war was relatively weak and uninspired. The most disappointing aspect of the book was its lack of insightful post-war analysis and impact of the war on our future military capabilities.

But, all in all, the book is a good read and well worth the cost for the outstanding pre-war analysis.

This novel is a solid and very informative overview of the war with Iraq, including a review of the earlier Desert Storm campaign and some reflections on the 12 years of containment and attrition the U.S. and the United Kingdom engaged in against Saddam Hussein.

Murray, one of the best military historians of our generation, and Scales, a retired Army major general and one of the leading intellectuals on the art of war and technological change, combine to give this book an enormous chronicle of warfare contemplation. A wide range of personal relationships also allowed the authors to interview many of the key participants immediately following the battles.

The Iraq War captures the audacity and daring of General Franks' campaign plan and the persistent boldness with which it was executed. Also emphasized is the fact that the component commanders truly understood Franks' intent and, when in doubt, took risks and kept pushing the envelope for more speed and more surprise.

There are no gigantic revelations in the authors' account of Operation Iraqi Freedom and their assessment of what worked and what didn't; however, they highlight some principles that every sophisticated American should reflect upon when thinking about our future national security policies. Several of these principles are covered in the remainder of this review.

Murray and Scales signify the human element in war and the stunning mismatch in technology, training, experience, and professionalism between the coalition and the Iraqis. But once the fighting shifted into the existing guerilla phase, most of those advantages lost much of their force.

An implicit contrast is drawn between the Marine Corps system of every member being a rifleman and every convoy being expected to protect itself and the very different Army model of inadequately trained non-combat soldiers being protected by combat forces. It is clear from their outline of events that the Marine Corps progress through the inhabited areas was actually much more challengeable than the third division's drive through the desert. This is not to