Approaches for Human Spaceflight in the Cold War and Post-Cold War Context

Approaches for Human Spaceflight in the Cold War

and Post-Cold War Context

When nations reflect on the greatest achievements of the Twentieth Century, man's first walk on the moon is one of the pinnacle examples of human accomplishments. The Space Age ushered in a new era of development in engineering, science, education, and commercialization, which continues to impact people, states, and the international community. At the same time, with global concerns of poverty, war, and economic inequality, some question the relevancy and urgency of nations to pursue space programs given their inherent high costs and risks. The paradox causes some to ask whether the same resources should be channeled to programs and institutions that would more directly alleviate these problems. While the reinforcement of pride and prestige have played an influential role in determining the U.S. and other nations' space policy, other factors such as national security, human destiny, commercial application, and scientific discovery have shaped and justified policies advocating human spaceflight programs. The following brief paper 1) describes these rationales as well as how they have influenced 2) the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations to engage in the Space Race in the 1960s, 3) establishment of the space shuttle and International Space Station (ISS) programs in the 1970s and 1980s, 4) other nations to participate in shuttle and ISS missions as a form of international cooperation. The paper closes with concluding points and observations.

Both Roger Launius and Vernon van Dyke list 1) human destiny, 2) national security, 3) national pride, and 4) scientific discovery as the most commonly cited reasons for space programs (Dyke pg. 5). Unlike Dyke, however, Launius adds commercial and other applications as a fifth factor (Launius pg. 38). The rationale of human destiny is the compulsion of man to explore and discover: "the thrust of curiosity that leads men to try to go where no one has gone before" (Dyke pg. 5). In contrast, the national security approach ensures a nation's security from nuclear holocaust. In other words, to prevent space from becoming a danger, a nation needs to be prepared to defend itself (Launius pg. 53). In conjunction, attaining national prestige by being a leader in space technology creates an image of strength and boldness to the international community (Dyke pg. 5). Undertaking scientific discovery provides the opportunity to better understand the earth, solar system, and universe (Dyke pg. 5). Lastly, the argument of commercial application describes how, for example, satellite communications has generated billions of dollars in products and services (Launius pg. 55). In general, while these rationales were originally articulated in the context of the U.S.-Soviet Cold War, each have had varying degrees of influence through the course of space policy history.

The two superpowers during the Cold War initially followed different approaches to their space policies in respects to satellite development in the 1950s. Stressing a more national security approach, the Soviet Union used a military launcher for the scientific mission envisaged in the International Geophysical Year (IGY) framework (Krige pg. 6). In the U.S.'s participation of IGY, however, the Eisenhower administration emphasized a more scientific exploration rationale in order to "establish the principle of freedom of space for civilian purposes" (Krige pg. 6). This approach was evidenced by Eisenhower's choice to launch the Naval Research Laboratory's Viking rocket, which was only designed to probe the upper atmosphere, instead of von Braun's Redstone, which had the capability of releasing a small satellite in orbit (Krige pg. 6). Although Eisenhower sought to make up for lost time in R&D for missiles development, his administration was more cautious in easing into the Space Age in order to "preserve American hopes for penetrating the Iron Curtain" (McDougall pg. 113). Eisenhower's rationale to project a scientific exploration approach to the international community was motivated by the main objective of preserving a civilian image in missile development (Krige pg. 6).

However, on 4 October 1957, the Soviet Union achieved what the Eisenhower administration was hesitant in pursuing by launching Sputnik I, the first operational satellite to reach orbit (Krige pg. 7). McDougall notes that, "Sputnik was a sharp slap to American pride...[as] it suggested Soviet technical and military parity with the West" (McDougall pg. 132). Despite the self-criticism and doubt circulating through national media, Eisenhower bared down by noting that the U.S. was not in a Sputnik race and again reiterated the rationale for scientific exploration: "The serving of science, not a high score in an outer space basketball game has been and still is our country's goal" (Krige pg. 7). His response is not surprising considering that since the beginning of his administration (1952-1961) Eisenhower believed that U.S.-Soviet tensions was not leading to a war in which the U.S. must prepare for at all costs, but rather a situation in which the U.S. should "prepare for the 'long haul,' for it could lose only by spending itself into bankruptcy" (McDougall pg. 113).

This is not to imply, though, that Eisenhower was not aware of the urgency that the bipolar dynamics of the Cold War had created. He strongly believed that "the relationship between economic and military strength is intimate and indivisible" (McDougall pg. 113). Rather as Dyke notes, "To some extent the emphasis on the military aspects of the space program has been restrained by a desire to stress peaceful purposes...the general intent seems to be to avoid creating alarm" (Dyke pg. 177). For example, in the background of these events, the U.S. was actually collaborating with the U.K. in developing its own independent Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile (IRBM), called Blue Streak, which was meant to serve as a deterrent in the European theatre (Krige pg. 9). The Blue Streak later became a civilian satellite launcher and laid the foundations for Europe's space program, which aimed to promote European competitive independence from the U.S. in advanced technology (McDougall pg. 208). Even though the collaboration was pursued with the purposes of maintaining regional and national security, its scope was different from the U.S.'s scientific exploration motivations in participating in the IGY.

With the launch of Sputnik I, though, Eisenhower's strategy of risk avoidance proved be very costly for his administration. He later changed his scientific exploration rationale as a result of the second launch of Sputnik 2 on